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PREFACE
As a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, I consider my first "joint assignment" to be as a student at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Although exposed to requests for support from other services on a few occasions while on the Army Staff, this is the first experience I have had in over twenty years to learn, evaluate and apply joint principles of combat operations. Coupled with the fact that our former Army Chiefs of Staff have made enormous strides in convincing Army personnel that we must "become joint" and eventually be "born joint," this is my first attempt at researching and writing about logistical challenges that are outside the realm of the Army.
Secondly, at the first opportunity to exercise logistical concepts in a joint environment in the form of a student campaign planning exercise, I was struck by the relevance of current and possibly future constraints on a Combatant Commander. One must now plan for operations within a reduced timeline and without the benefit of sufficient ports and facilities to bring in more than a small expeditionary force with limited logistics. The Combatant Commander in our joint exercise had enough forces allocated and, if given over 90 days, could have introduced up to two Corps into the Theater of Operations. During this exercise, constraints allowed much less than that to flow into theater over a 60 day period. The available ports could not immediately support an Intermediate Logistics Base for the first 30 days.
Finally, an Army War College guest speaker remarked that if students felt they were here to learn a few (joint) issues and then be able to return to their respective service staffs, they may not understand the definition of "jointness." Even if a student were to return to his/her respective service in either a staff or leadership role, current operations dictate a joint and interdependent mindset. This paper will delve into the possibilities for an Army logistician to examine and perhaps incorporate some Naval logistic methodologies into a Theater of In comparison to the Army's doctrine for forced entry and sustainment operations, the Marine Corps relies upon the Navy to enable forced entry and resupply its forces in the most efficient and effective way. The Navy utilizes both sea and air to resupply Marine ground forces, taking advantage of modularity and span of reach as well as non-military support for common items found on the economy. The Navy often moves Marine maneuver forces around the world to areas without allied forces in country, without easy access to sea and air ports, and without the minimum infrastructure to support early entry. The Marine Corps, which has always been an amphibious, early entry force, has expanded its expeditionary capability by projecting forces inland up to 100 miles. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are the force of choice for
Combatant Commanders because of their flexibility to project power, using a loiter capability, anywhere within a short timeframe. A MEU consists of 1,500 to 3,000 soldiers with 15 days of supply and has a six hour response time for deployment. Similarly, the Army's Stryker Brigade has approximately 3,600 soldiers with three to six days of supply and a five to 21 day response time (from Hawaii to South America to sub-Saharan Africa). 1 While the Stryker Brigade is designed for insertion by the Air Force, the Army could benefit from developing a closer partnership with the Navy for both power projection and resupply, allowing it more flexibility to project and sustain forces in austere theaters.
First, I will discuss the Army's power projection requirement, in terms of the newly formed Stryker Brigade. I will then compare and contrast Army and Navy methods for obtaining logistical support given constrained environments for insertion of maneuver forces and logistical units. I have chosen the Stryker Brigade as the "unit of measure" upon which to compare methods of support, as the new Army Brigade's mission for early entry is comparable to that of a MEU or a MEB (at about 3,000 to 3,600 soldiers), which is often inserted by Naval forces in these same environments. Finally, I will suggest opportunities for the Army and Navy to become more interdependent in providing joint logistical support to Combatant Commanders.
THE ARMY'S POWER PROJECTION REQUIREMENT
The following power projection data comes from a U.S. According to Army deployment planning data, it would take about two days for loading ships and another two days to unload them after arrival, compared to hours for loading and unloading aircraft.
Furthermore, many areas of the world in which Stryker brigades are anticipated to operate have no access to a seaport, and not all seaports would have the capacity to handle large deep-draft vessels. Stryker brigades are organized and equipped to begin operations soon after arrival in an operational theater, carrying up to three days' supplies of the fuel and ammunition and sustainment items, allowing the brigades to immediately conduct a combat mission. While the Army set out to design Stryker brigades to be a rapidly air deployable force, Army officials now recognize that airlift alone will not be sufficient and that some combination of airlift and sealift will likely be used to deploy the brigades. To make Stryker brigades easier to deploy and support, the Army designed the brigades with a support structure that is only about one-third the size of that found in a heavy armored brigade. Thus, Stryker brigades do not have the capability to sustain operations without the assistance of external support organizations and resources." 2 We have now established that the Army has evaluated and is seeking to reach the fourday goal for power projection of an early entry force. But how can the Army sustain this force after having consumed its Air Force power projection assets on only one Brigade? Some amount of lift would likely be required for sustainment, delaying follow-on forces from entering the fight. A short discussion of how the Navy sustains Marine forces shows some similarities to the Army's challenges as well as some unique differences.
NAVAL SUPPORT DOCTRINE
Unlike the Army's logistical support structure, which is built upon functional units that align with combat forces and must move with these maneuver forces to establish Lines of Communication (LOCs), the Navy operates on a more spatial relationship of support to forces.
Forces are grouped by sea or area and provide support via sea lines of communications. The metaphor is "hub and spoke," which connotes a span of logistical assets that service the maneuver units in a radial arc.
"At sea, a Naval Logistic organization for forces afloat is often supported across multiple lines of communication from sites both within and without the operating area. These sites may be under control of different numbered fleet commanders. The forces afloat can also move in and out of the combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR), drawing sustainment from changing combatant commanders as they transit the ocean. Shore-based forces in theater have different support requirements than forces afloat, and in some theaters may fall under different service logistics command and control organizations per Executive Agent agreements. Certain Naval forces ashore may be reassigned between Navy and Marine Corps (or other-Service) control, shifting support responsibilities. Finally, Marine Corps forces afloat may shift substantial support requirements from Navy to Marine Corps logistics organizations when they go ashore. The commander of the afloat forces will exercise control of logistics through a Fleet Logistics Coordinator (FLC), Task Force Logistics Coordinator (TFLC), or Task Group Logistics Coordinator (TGLC)." 3 In this manner, the Navy provides support over the seas, which comprises over 70 percent of the earth's surface. Instead of aligning logistics to forces in a "tooth to tail" ratio, the Navy aligns support to areas and anticipates forces movement throughout in a fluid environment without boundaries. Additionally, "hospital ships and prepositioning ships act as [logistical multipliers, providing] defense stock points, strategic transporters, theater transporters, and combat service support providers. With these various assets, a full range of strategic and theater distribution functions is possible with limited or no theater shorebased support. While forward basing, fixed or expeditionary, is critical to support maneuver and provide economy of operations and throughput capacity, naval forces afloat are able to maintain station anywhere." The Navy's one similarity to the Army is that it aggressively capitalizes upon contractor support for common requirements. The Navy follows the principle of economy. Simply stated:
"Host nation and multinational agreements for specific support will often result in substantial savings in distribution. Shared resources and shortened transportation legs made possible by these agreements allow a distribution system that is at once more responsive and more economical. Increasing commonality and interoperability of multinational supported and supporting forces continue to enhance this trend. Distribution through the multinational system economically offers the certainty of support necessary to mission accomplishment." 6 The Navy, like the Army, relies on contractor support for both sea and land operations. "Under the PBL program, NAVICP [Naval Inventory Control Point] awards a contract or work request to a single supplier. This supplier provides material directly to our customers in time to meet the customer's requirements. This is achieved without the intervention of, or need for, government inventory managers or intervening storage and material handling systems while providing increased product reliability and reducing total cost to the fleet customer and the Navy. The PBL suppliers may take on a number of functions normally performed by various DoD services or agencies.
These functions may include spare parts requirements determination, physical distribution, warehousing of material, depot level maintenance, and some engineering functions." 7 
FUTURE CONCEPTS FOR NAVAL LOGISTICS
One of the most exciting concepts the Navy has for overcoming problems of force entry and support where access is either constrained or denied is called "Sea Basing." Providing support to expeditionary forces on the shore directly from the sea reduces or may even eliminate the logistic footprint on the shore and allow access to land without a large logistical tail. Pre-positioned ships with cargo that is accessible to be offloaded from the sea means undeveloped ports may no longer restrict the force. While the Army is still struggling with logistical requirements for early entry forces, studies on the newest cargo ship, the High Speed Vessel (HSV) may be the answer to execute resupply from a Sea Base.
"The HSV's ability to transport a battalion and its combat equipment delivered together at high speeds in one trip is a great advantage to a combatant commander. The HSV has already proven the capacity to reliably transport a 400-ton load to include 370 Marines and their camp gear, five Cobra helicopters, two Huey helicopters and aviation ground support equipment from Japan to Guam within 40 hours at far less time and cost than the currently employed airlift. In another configuration the HSV would be able to move over 800 Soldiers/Marines, 60 ground vehicles and 30 storage containers from the Kin pier to Yokohama in under 30 hours." However, a TSC can be a huge organization --one whose footprint the Army is trying to reduce. Unfortunately, the Stryker Brigade is reliant upon a TSC for support when its initial supplies from its support element are exhausted. 11 In order for a TSC to provide tactical level sustainment for our new, early entry force, some sort of build-up period, or ISB must be They were successfully employed in Operations DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE and JOINT ENDEAVOR. 13 According to Army Regulation 570-9, "to complement DOD operational mission resourcing for crises, transition to war, and wartime, the U.S. Army actively seeks to increase its overseas combat potential through the formal establishment of HNS agreements with Allied and friendly foreign nations' governments." 14 HNS agreements can be purely logistical in nature, i.e., a financial reimbursement agreement for infrastructure, supplies and services, or can involve the stationing of troops, which is a more tangible commitment of strategic importance. Uses of bilateral agreements are also suitable for far more than an exchange of supplies or services. For example, Rust Deming, principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, notes that the 47,000 Americans in Japan and 36,000 in South Korea are forward deployed for strategic reasons. They allow regional economies to thrive, they prevent a military power vacuum from developing, and they spur the partner to increase defense spending. 15 forces that have only a few days of logistics. Our greatest asset is our defense dollar, which is sometimes now used to "buy" allegiance (e.g., Iraqi Police forces). But until major reforms in organization of logistic forces come into effect, both options (HNS and contracting) for nonmilitary support should be secondary and tertiary to our main strategy: that of long-standing multinational agreements. The National Security Strategy of forward presence in today's constrained logistical environment can only be strengthened with international agreements --agreements that have the added advantage of providing a more responsive, less cumbersome logistical tail.
Utilization of so many support tools to marshal logistics assets in logistically constrained environments or in areas that do not allow ready access to large forces seems contrary to efforts to reduce logistical footprints. Even Martin van Creveld, in his historical analysis Supplying War, notes that the proportion of support to combat troops is frequently cited as an indicator of an army's efficiency, with a low proportion representing a high efficiency. 20 The same misunderstanding of proportional support is prevalent today. Senior logisticians' goals seem to be to reduce the logistical footprint by 50 percent. But the push for reductions today is based on transportation constraints, not a desire for increased efficiency. Martin van Creveld's premise was the proportion of support to combat troops could indeed be 100:1, if that were the optimum ratio to win the campaign. Realizing that we can't take it all with us, at least not quickly, the option of getting the correct ratio of logistical support through multinational agreements makes sense. There is no requirement that the 100 support troops needed to support one combat soldier to be troops with US uniforms. 
USE OF ARMY AND NAVY METHODS FOR PROVIDING SUPPORT TO MAXIMIZE INTERDEPENDENCY (JOINTNESS)
The reduction of logistical support in the Army's new Stryker Brigade will be characteristic of all new early entry organizations. Even the MEU, originally designed as an amphibious assault unit for beachheads and ports and later evolving to a strike force capable of driving hundreds of miles inward, is logistically constrained to 15 days of supply. Similarly, the "staying power" or minimal days of supply will require aggressive methods of resupply from all the services.
Reliance upon non-U.S. support will increase in the form of contracts, HNS, and multinational agreements. A prudent logistician will see that these tools become a logistics force multiplier when U.S. distribution and power projection capacities are taxed. Both the Army and Navy are doing more to capitalize upon these sources.
The Army could use the examples of Navy (and Marine) organizations and methods of resupply to become more modular and less uniquely functional in nature. The TSC combines functional organizations under one commander for conservation of resources and unity of command. The Navy operates in a more spatial nature, like a hub and spoke, growing and constricting where necessary to provide the correct span of coverage.
The Army and Navy's combined efforts to support from a Sea Base only makes sense as the Army cannot always establish forward presence, with associated costly infrastructure, worldwide. Since conflicts are now arising in areas of the world where we have limited resources, the Navy and Army can combine power projection and resupply efforts similar to the Navy-Marine relationship. By simply establishing a relationship with the Navy for programmed resupply, the Army can reduce its almost total reliance on Air Force assets. The Army has built its early entry force around the Stryker Brigade and made requirements known to the Air Force for strategic lift. The Future Combat System, the Army's future force, will also be designed around an Air Force parameter --the C130, but it could easily be designed for transport in a future naval ship such as the HSV. The Army should now focus efforts on defining requirements for support from the Navy for both power projection and Sea Basing. With defined requirements, both services can work on overcoming any technology limits for supporting
Stryker and Stryker-like brigades from the sea. Interdependence of the services for force deployment and sustainment is a huge part of getting to the fight.
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